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1. INTRODUCTION
Our long-term goal is to offer a full-fledged formalization of context, one that can be used
in, among other areas, natural language processing. In this paper, which can be regarded as a
tentative step toward that end, we will identify the role of context in language and take a look
at some salient efforts in (logical) AI treating formal contexts. In general, the focus of our
discussion will be McCarthy’s proposal (McCarthy 1987, 1993), which is the groundwork for
all ensuing logicist formalizations. While the main purpose of McCarthy, viz. a mechanism
by which we can build AI systems which are not forever stuck with the concepts they use at
a given time (because they can surpass the context they are in), is still largely unfulfilled, we
will see that important advances have been made (Guha 1991; Shoham 1991; McCarthy and
S. Buvač 1994; S. Buvaˇc and Mason 1995; Attardi and Simi 1995).
Our model of context, on the other hand, is inspired by the pioneering work of Barwise
(1986) on conditionals, and will be presented using the notation and terminology of situation
theory (Barwise and Perry 1983; Devlin 1991). After giving the minimum background to
situation theory, we will state this model and discuss an application of it in lifting, i.e., the
process of computing what is true in one context based on what is true in another context
(McCarthy and S. Buvaˇc 1994). The situation theoretic model has notable properties such
as partiality, dynamic contexts, and natural language support. It links our work with NLP
in a simple, natural way: Reasoning is essential for NLP, knowledge representation is a
prerequisite for any kind of reasoning, and situation theory can be used both as a KR scheme
and to support contextual reasoning.1
2. CONTEXT IN NATURAL LANGUAGE
“You shall know a word by the company it keeps.” This remark of J. R. Firth, famed
British linguist, seems to us an apt reminder for the ubiquity of context. According to Crystal
(1991, p. 78), ‘context’ is a general term in linguistics and phonetics to refer to specific parts
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between that survey and the present paper. A preliminary version of this paper has appeared as Surav and Akman (1995). Also
see Akman and Surav (1995) for related ideas on contexts and situation theory.
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of an utterance (or text) near or adjacent to a unit (e.g., a sound, word) which is the focus of
attention. The occurrence of a unit is partly or wholly determined by its context, which is
specified in terms of the unit’s relations. Blackburn (1994, p. 80) offers a similar definition:
“In linguistics, context is the parts of an utterance surrounding a unit and which may affect
both its meaning and its grammatical contribution.” However, he is quick to add that context
also refers to “the wider situation, either of the speaker or of the surroundings, that may play
a part in determining the significance of a saying.”
Leech (1981, pp. 66–67) notes that the specification of context (whether linguistic or
nonlinguistic) has the effect of narrowing down the communicative possibilities of a message.
This particularization of meaning can take place in assorted ways, including: (i) elimination
of certain ambiguities or multiple meanings in the message, (ii) clarification of the referents of
deictics and definite descriptions, (iii) supplying of information which the writer has omitted
through ellipsis, (iv) interpretation of tense, and (v) determination of the scope of quantifiers.
It is standard nowadays to use the term ‘co-text’ for the narrow, purely linguistic context
(Lyons 1995, p. 271). As for the total nonlinguistic background to an utterance (including:
the immediate situation in which it is used, the knowledge of speaker and hearer about
the commonsense world, the knowledge of what has been said earlier, the relevant beliefs
and presuppositions of speaker and hearer), the term ‘situational context’ has been offered
(Crystal 1991, p. 79). Similarly, Lyons (1995, p. 271) uses the term ‘context of situation’
as a synonym for situational context. He believes that natural language meaning must be
studied as a multiple phenomenon, its numerous aspects being relatable to (i) different levels
of linguistic analysis, and (ii) features of the world.
Being one of those linguistic abstractions that is constantly used in all kinds of contexts
[sic] but never explained, the establishment of relevant context in NLP is traditionally seen
as a formidable problem. M. Pinkal voices this difficulty in a vivid passage that appears in
Asher and Simpson (1994, p. 733):
Aside from the surrounding deictic coordinates, aside from the immediate lin-
guistic co-text and accompanying gestural expressions at closer view, the following
determinants can influence the attribution of sense: the entire frame of interaction,
the individual biographies of the participants, the physical environment, the social
embedding, the cultural and historical background, and—in addition to all these—
facts and dates no matter how far removed in dimensions of time and space. Roughly
speaking, ‘context’ can be the whole world in relation to an utterance act.
But observations such as these also show that the quest for idealized, context-independent
meaning (which goes under the name ‘logical form’ in semantics) is seriously misdirected.2
Taking an engineering attitude and studying contexts as mathematical entities with properties
useful in AI or NLP (to take two examples) seems to be the only viable approach. This is
what McCarthy did in his distinguished work on formal contexts and what others (including
us) hope to follow suit.
2Barwise (1986, p. 99) dubs the idea behind this quest the ‘fleshing out strategy,’ because it is based on the following
assumption: sentences whose interpretation depends on some annoying contextual element can be fleshed out to sentences
where that contextual element is eradicated. He then adds: “I assume that this strategy is wrong-headed, that it has been shown
to be unworkable, and that it should now be laid to rest.”
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3. CONTEXT IN LOGICAL AI
3.1. The Work of McCarthy
McCarthy offers no definition of context. His underlying assumption is that “[t]here are
mathematical context structures of different properties, some of which are useful” (McCarthy
1996, p. 2). He wittily remarks that asking what a context is is like asking what a group element
is.
McCarthy’s basic relation relating contexts and propositions isi t(c, p), asserting that
propositionp is true in contextc. The origin of this relation can be traced to the Turing lecture
(the written version) of McCarthy (1987). McCarthy notes that formulasist(c, p) are always
considered as themselves asserted within an outer contextc0 such thatist(c0, ist(c, p)).
The importance ofist(c, p) for NLP can be seen by noticing that although the set of
propositions true in a context may be finite, the collection of natural language sentences that
can express these propositions will be infinite (McCarthy 1996). This is especially crucial in
translation tasks, e.g., interpreting a source language sentence and constructing an equivalent
target language sentence. For typical translation tasks, the target sentence must succeed in
communicating the propositional content of the original sentence, and having propositions
(rather than sentences) as the basic building blocks helps in this endeavor (Farwell and
Helmreich 1995).
Contexts are ‘first-class citizens.’ We can use contexts in our logical formulas in the same
way we use other objects. In other words, contexts are formal objects in the semantics; they
can be denoted by constants in the logical language and when necessary, variables can range
over them.
Each context has a vocabulary associated with it. Thus, a given statement may not
be expressible in some context (due to the impoverished vocabulary of that context). In
yet another context it would be expressed differently. It is noted that since there is no
absolute outermost context, it is necessary to have an adequate notion of transcendence, i.e.,
outstripping the outermost context so far referred to. Transcendence is the way to relax or
modify some assumptions of an old context; it is essentially a move from a context that makes
certain assumptions to one that does not (McCarthy and S. Buvaˇc 1994).
In order to implement transcendence, an appropriate set of nonmonotonic rules for lifting
sentences to broader contexts is required. By lifting a predicate (or formula, axiom, etc.)
from one context to another related context, we mean transferring that predicate (or formula,
axiom, etc.) to broader contexts—those involving fewer assumptions. As an illustration of
lifting, consider the relation ‘more general than’ (¹). The inequalityc1 ¹ c2 states thatc2 is
more general thanc1 (equivalently,c1 is a specialization ofc2). Essentially,c2 involves no
more assumptions thanc1. Using¹, a fact from a context to one of its supercontexts can be
lifted via the lifting rule
∀c1∀c2∀p (c1 ¹ c2) ∧ ist(c1, p) ∧ ¬ab(p, c1, c2)→ ist(c2, p)
wherep is a proposition ofc1 andab is an abnormality predicate to support nonmonotonicity.
When we regard contexts in the natural deduction sense—as McCarthy (1987) sug-
gested—the operations of entering and leaving a context might be given succinct definitions
(McCarthy and S. Buvaˇc 1994). Basically, sinceist(c, p)will be analogous toc : p (namely,
propositionp is given in contextc) in natural deduction, the operation of enteringc can be
seen as assumingp in c. Enteringc, inferring another propositionq from p (as a result of
noticing p→ q, say), and leavingc will let one assertist(c,q) in the outer context.
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3.2. Logicists’ Works Inspired by McCarthy
Guha (1991) models contexts with ‘microtheories’ and uses them in Cyc, a large-scale,
highly modular commonsense reasoning program (Guha and Lenat 1994). Microtheories
are theories of limited domains. They have two basic properties: (i) there is a set of axioms
related to each microtheory, and (ii) there is a vocabulary that tells us the syntax and semantics
of each predicate and each function specific to the microtheory. Different microtheories make
different assumptions about the world. Similar to McCarthy’s conception, they are interrelated
via lifting rules stated in an outer context.
Shoham (1991) uses the alternative notationpc to denote that assertionp holds in context
c. Shoham’s purpose is not really to offer a precise semantics forpc. He is more interested
in studying the interaction between modal operators (e.g., the knowledge operatorK in the
logic of knowledge) and context. His notion of contextual knowledge, denoted asK c p and
meaning “p is known in contextc,” is a fitting example.
S. Buvač and Mason (1993)—and in a more recent work, S. Buvaˇc, V. Buvač, and Mason
(1995)—investigate the logical properties of contexts. They also useist(c, p) to denote
context-dependent truth. Using this modality, they extend the classical propositional logic to
what they call the ‘propositional logic of context.’ In their proposal, each context is considered
to have its own vocabulary—a set of propositional atoms which are defined or meaningful in
that context.
For Giunchiglia (1993), context is just a subset of facts from the knowledge base plus the
reasoning machinery to compute with it. In formal terms, a contextci is a triple〈λi , αi , δi 〉
whereλi is the language of the context,αi is the set of axioms of the context, andδi is the
inference mechanism of the context. Under this definition, there are bridge rules of the form
〈Ai ,ci 〉
〈Aj ,cj 〉 , whereAi is a formula inci and Aj is the newly derived formula incj . Thus, the
analogue of McCarthy’sist formula (asserted inc0) becomes
〈A,c〉
〈ist(A,c),c0〉 .
Attardi and Simi (1995) present a formalization of their notion of ‘viewpoint,’ meant for
expressing varieties of relativized truth. Viewpoints denote sets of sentences which represent
the axioms of a theory. The basic relation isin(′σ ′, vp). This says thatσ is a sentence
provable from viewpointvp by means of natural deduction.
4. THE SITUATION THEORETIC APPROACH
Situation theory is a mathematical theory of information (Devlin 1991). Two of its
primitive concepts are infons and situations. Infons are the basic units that embody discrete
items of information. They are denoted as〈〈R,a1, . . . ,an, i 〉〉, whereR is ann-place relation,
a1, . . . ,an are objects appropriate for the respective argument places ofR, andi is the polarity
(1 if R holds, 0 ifR does not hold).
A situation is a limited portion of the world (over some location and time), which can be
picked out by a cognitive agent. It thus corresponds rather well to the intuitive meaning of
‘situation’ in English. For example, the sentence “I solved a puzzle during the invited talk
of Cooper” describes an activity performed at a particular time and location, individuated as
the situation ‘the invited talk of Cooper.’ Situations make certain infons factual. Using a
notation deceptively hinting at first-order logic,s is said to supportι (symbolically,s |= ι)
provided thatι is an infon that is true of situations.
Abstract situations are the mathematical (albeit ontologically impoverished) counterparts
of real situations, and unlike the latter, are amenable to symbolic manipulation. Given a real
situations, the set{ι | s |= ι} is taken to be the corresponding abstract situation. (This set
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will be nonwellfounded whens is a circular situation. However, this need not concern us in
this paper.)
Let s be a given situation. Following the standard practice, we require the availability of
some device for making reference to arbitrary objects of a given type,3 viz. parameters. Iḟx
is a parameter andI is a finite set of infons (involvinġx), then there is a type [ẋ | s |= ∧ι∈I ι].
This is the type of those objects to whichẋ may be anchored4 in s, so that all the conditions
in I obtain. We refer to this process of obtaining a type—from a parameterẋ, a situations,
and a setI of infons—as type abstraction. Hereẋ is the abstraction parameter ands is the
‘grounding’ situation.
In situation theory, the flow of information is realized via constraints. We denote a
constraint asS1 ⇒ S2 (corresponding, in essence, to the infon〈〈involves, S1, S2, 1〉〉, read
‘ S1 involvesS2’), whereS1 andS2 are situation types. Cognitively, if this relation holds, then
it is a fact that ifS1 is realized (i.e., there is a real situations1 of typeS1), then so isS2 (i.e.,
there is a real situations2 of typeS2). For instance, the constraintSs⇒ St , where
Ss = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈slaps, ȧ, ḃ, l̇ , ṫ, 1〉〉]
St = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈touches, ȧ, ḃ, l̇ , ṫ, 1〉〉]
may be used to correctly infer that if Alice slapped Bob in a given situation (with spatio-
temporal coordinateṡl andṫ), then she touched him in that very same situation (Devlin 1991,
p. 92).
4.1. Toward a Formalization of Context in Situation Theory
Following Barwise (1986), we will treat context as an amalgamation of a grounding
situation and the rules that govern the relations within the context. Thus we will represent a
context by a situation type that supports two kinds of infons: (i) factual infons to state facts,
and (ii) constraints (which correspond to parametric conditionals) to capture the if–then
relations holding within the context.
For example, lets be Sullivan’s M.S. thesis presentation context at Drofnats University.
Acker is Sullivan’s advisor, and Leyner and Kraft are members of Sullivan’s jury. Accordingly,





Let us assume that at Drofnats, there exists an academic regulation valid for all thesis
presentation contexts, given by the constraintC below:
S1 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈msadvisor, ȧ, ḃ, 1〉〉]
S2 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈msjurymember, ȧ, ḃ, 1〉〉]
C = S1⇒ S2 | B.
3The basic types of situation theory include temporal locations, spatial locations, individuals, relations, situations, infons,
etc. (Devlin 1991, p. 53).
4An ‘anchor’ is simply a function that assigns to each parameter in a set of parameters an object of a particular type.
5For simplicity, spatiotemporal coordinatesl̇ andṫ are omitted throughout the example.
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C codifies the nonmonotonic rule that at Drofnats, advisors are usually jury members of
their advisees. In terms of infons, the constraintC could be written as〈〈involves,S1,S2,B, 1〉〉.
The extra argumentB in C is new and requires explanation (Barwise 1986; Devlin 1991).
B is a set of background conditions under whichC will convey information (rather than
misinformation), and thus may profitably be employed by a cognitive agent ‘attuned’ toC.
Basically, we have〈〈involves,S1,S2, 1〉〉 as long as the background conditions inB are met.
One such condition in our example may be as follows:6
B |= 〈〈kinsman, ȧ, ḃ, 0〉〉
Then it is enough simply that the conditions inB obtain under the particular circumstances,
i.e., s |= 〈〈kinsman,Acker,Sullivan, 0〉〉. Thus, usings as a grounding situation with the
anchoring f (ȧ) = Ackerand f (ḃ) = Sullivan, we can infer, viaC, that Acker must also be
a member of Sullivan’s jury.
After this example, let us review the desired properties of context, and check whether our
proposal supports them.
4.2. Contexts versus Situations
During the review of McCarthy’s work, we stated that contexts are first-class objects, so
that one can use them in the same way as other objects. In our approach, we are modeling
contexts with situation types, and situation types are situations that have some unbound
parameters. Other than having unbound parameters, situation types are ordinary situations,
and thus first-class objects of situation theory.
Richness of contexts was stated by McCarthy (1987, 1993) and Guha (1991). A rich
object cannot be defined completely using extensional means. In situation theory, situations
are, by definition, rich objects (Devlin 1991). Clearly, the richness of situations leads to the
partiality of contexts, as McCarthy advocates.
Another aspect of the use of context is the flexibility of having private rules and presup-
positions related to a particular point of view. In the logicist approach, presuppositions are
represented with predicates that contain no variables and rules are usually represented with
quantified logical implications, e.g.:
c: present(air)
c: ∀x bird(x)→ flies(x).
The first line states that air is present in the environment (a presupposition), and the
second line states that if something is a bird then it flies (a default rule).
The same capability is also available in our notion of context. We represent the facts
related to a particular context with parameter-free infons supported by the situation type that
corresponds to the context. The rules of the context are represented by constraints. Therefore,
we can useC below to correspond toc:
S1 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈bird, ȧ, 1〉〉]
S2 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈flies, ȧ, 1〉〉]
B |= 〈〈present, air, 1〉〉 ∧ 〈〈penguin, ȧ, 0〉〉 ∧ · · ·
C = S1⇒ S2 | B.
6For the sake of the argument, imagine another, bizarre academic regulation: If the advisor and the student are relatives—
however distant—then the advisor cannot be in the jury.
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HereB is the set of conditions that render the default rule true. Barwise (1986, p. 124) points
out to an intricate issue regarding such background conditions: “[T]he exact information
content of a statement of a general conditional [is] highly context dependent, which seems
right. However, it might appear to be too context dependent, since it could happen that the
exact information content is not even determined by what the speaker knows, in that he or she
might not know what the relevant conditionsB are.” In our model, the context representation
is designed to supply just the adequate background information, e.g., context defines the
domain of quantification. This property of context is due to its use as a grounding situation,
so that in the binding of parameters, the only available objects are those available in the
context.
5. REWORKING MCCARTHY’S LIFTING EXAMPLE
Lifting axioms are used to relate truth in one context to truth in another context. Since
the vocabularies, languages, and assumptions of the source context and target context are
usually different, these differences need to be addressed during the lifting. Lifting needs to
be as ‘meaning-preserving’ as possible (Guha and Lenat 1994) and this makes it useful for
NLP applications where preserving meaning is highly desirable, e.g., translation or natural
language generation tasks. Consider the following simple scenario (Guha 1991, p. 35) which
shows that a person interested in NLP should care about lifting:
Fred is standing in front of Chris. There is a flower pot to the left of Chris. Fred says “I like that
flower pot to your left.” Let this statement beF1 and the context in which this is uttered beC1. Chris
then moves so that the flower pot is to his right and tells Fred that he did not hear what Fred just said and
asks him to say it again. Fred wants to convey the same message in this new context (C2) but cannot
use the same sentence (F1). The sentence which states the same thing in this new context is “I like that
flower pot to your right.” Call this second sentenceF2. F1 states inC1 exactly whatF2 states inC2.
Given F1, C1, andC2, the process of obtainingF2 from F1 is called lifting F1 from C1 to C2.
In the remainder of this section, we will redo a lifting example due to McCarthy (1993).
The example, just like Guha’s, is conceptually trivial but is illustrative of the technicalities
lifting poses in general.
McCarthy considers two contexts, namely,Above-Theory(AT) andc. AT is the context
that expresses a static theory of the blocks world predicateson andabove, cf. Eqs. 1 and 2
(to follow). In AT, the notion of situation—in the sense of situation calculus (McCarthy and
Hayes 1969)—is not available.7 However, we need to lift the results ofAT to outer contexts
that do involve situations—again in the sense of situation calculus—or times. The contextc
is such a context; it contains the theory of blocks world expressed using situation calculus,
cf. Eqs. 3, 4, and 5. For example, the predicateon(x, y) (of AT) becomeson(x, y, s) in c,
wheres denotes the situation in whichon(x, y) holds. We want to useAT in c. In other
words, c needs to relate its predicateson(x, y, s) and above(x, y, s) to predicateson(x, y)
andabove(x, y) of AT. This is realized bycontext− of(s), a function giving a context that
depends on the situation parameters. Equations 3 and 4 associate a contextcontext− of(s)
with each situations. Equation 5 is the major lifting rule, which asserts that the facts ofAT
all hold in the contexts associated with situations. The bottom line in McCarthy’s example is,
givenc0: ist(c, on(A,B,S0)) prove thatc0: ist(c, above(A,B,S0)). (As usual,c0 is an outer
context.)
7A good justification for this is given in McCarthy and Buvaˇc (1994, p. 6): “In reasoning about the predicates themselves
it is convenient not to make them depend on situations or on a time parameter.”
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Here are the axioms mentioned above, all in one place:
AT: ∀x∀y on(x, y)→ above(x, y) (1)
AT: ∀x∀y∀z above(x, y) ∧ above(y, z)→ above(x, z) (2)
c: ∀x∀y∀s on(x, y, s)↔ ist(context− of(s), on(x, y)) (3)
c: ∀x∀y∀s above(x, y, s)↔ ist(context− of(s), above(x, y)) (4)
c: ∀p∀s ist(AT, p)→ ist(context− of(s), p) (5)
The proof of McCarthy proceeds as follows:
c0: ist(c, on(A,B,S0)) (6)
c: ist(context− of(S0), on(A,B)) (7)
context− of(S0): on(A,B) (8)
c: ist(context− of(S0), ∀x∀y on(x, y)→ above(x, y)) (9)
context− of(S0): ∀x∀y on(x, y)→ above(x, y) (10)
c: ist(context− of(S0), above(A,B)) (11)
c: above(A,B,S0). (12)
Briefly, Eq. 6 is the assumption given in the problem statement. Equation 7 is obtained
from Eqs. 3 and 6 by pluggingA for x, B for y, andS0 for s. Equation 8 obtained from
Eq. 7 by enteringcontext− of(S0). Equation 9 is the result of lifting Eq. 1 by the lifting rule
(Eq. 5). Enteringcontext− of(S0) we obtain Eq. 10. From Eqs. 8 and 10, we obtain Eq. 11.
Now using Eqs. 4 and 11 we arrive at Eq. 12. The desired conclusion immediately follows
from Eq. 12.
This proof can be visualized as in 0 1. In the figure, contexts are represented as Venn
diagrams. Atomic formulas are represented with capital letters, and transfers between contexts
are represented by arrows. We have labeled arrows in order to refer to the way the proof
grows. Basically, McCarthy is drawing a virtual arrow from the atomic formulaX to the
atomic formulaV . Sincec has no rule to draw an arrow fromX to V , he first creates
context−of(S0) and draws an arrow to the atomic formulaY using Eq. 3. AfterY, McCarthy
lifts the implication ofabove(x, y) from on(x, y) (the arrow labeled with 3 in the figure) to
context− of(S0); i.e., he forms the arrow labeled with 6. Then fromY, by tracing this arrow,
he gets toU . FromU , by leavingcontext−of(S0), he concludes with the desired formulaV .
In the proof of McCarthy, it would be more natural to use the path 1-2-3-4-5. However,
this path requires one more rule to transferY to Z (the arrow labeled with 2). In Attardi and
Simi (1995), this is explicitly stated and a proof is carried out with the mentioned path. In
the following reworking of McCarthy’s example, we will also follow the path 1-2-3-4-5. But
first some provisos:
1. In McCarthy’s original example,onandabovehave different arities in different contexts.
For instance, inAT on’s arity is two whereas inc its arity is three. However, in situation
theory, we may refer ton andabovein different contexts with different names (Devlin
1991, p. 115).8
2. Instead ofcontext− of(s) we will use〈〈context− of, ṡ, σ̇ , 1〉〉 whereṡ is a parameter
of type situation (in situation theory) anḋσ is a parameter of type situation (in situation
calculus). Thus,̇s is the context corresponding tȯσ .
8Thus, we are duplicating relations to facilitate different usages. Although it does not simplify the analysis in the sequel,
a more principled alternative—the one Devlin adopts—is to work with relations having a single, fixed number of argument
places, but to allow the use of relations with unfilled argument roles.
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FIGURE 1. Diagram of McCarthy’s proof.
3. The contextsc0, c, andATof McCarthy will be represented with the situations (in situation
theory)cc0, cc, andcAT, respectively.
4. The background conditionsBAT, BcAT, and BAT c9 will be shown below but will not
be employed in the proof, since the original proof of McCarthy does not involve any
nonmonotonic inference.10
The axioms of McCarthy will be captured by the following situation theoretic constructs
(we do not need Eq. 5):
S11 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈onAT, ẋ, ẏ, 1〉〉]
S12 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈aboveAT, ẋ, ẏ, 1〉〉]
cAT |= 〈〈involves, S11, S12, BAT, 1〉〉
(13)
S21 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈aboveAT, ẋ, ẏ, 1〉〉 ∧ 〈〈aboveAT, ẏ, ż, 1〉〉]
S22 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈aboveAT, ẋ, ż, 1〉〉]
cAT |= 〈〈involves, S21, S22, BAT, 1〉〉
(14)
9BAT denotes the background conditions used in the constraints inAT, BcAT the background conditions used in lifting
from c to AT, andBAT c the background conditions used in lifting fromAT to c.
10Recall that when we use background conditions to implement nonmonotonicity, we are basically looking for the
opposites of the background conditions to appear in the context. If we do not find any opposites in the context, we conclude
that the background conditions are not being violated.
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S31 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈onc, ẋ, ẏ, σ̇ , 1〉〉]
cAT = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈onAT, ẋ, ẏ, 1〉〉]
cc |= 〈〈context− of, ṡ, σ̇ , 1〉〉
cc |= 〈〈involves, S31, cAT, BcAT, 1〉〉
cc |= 〈〈involves, cAT, S31, BAT c, 1〉〉
(15)
S41 = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈abovec, ẋ, ẏ, σ̇ , 1〉〉]
cAT = [ṡ | ṡ |= 〈〈aboveAT, ẋ, ẏ, 1〉〉]
cc |= 〈〈context− of, ṡ, σ̇ , 1〉〉
cc |= 〈〈involves, S41, cAT, BcAT, 1〉〉
cc |= 〈〈involves, cAT, S41, BAT c, 1〉〉.
(16)
Initially, McCarthy hasc0: ist(c, on(A,B,S0)). Theon relation can be represented with
the infonιi = 〈〈onc, A, B, S0, 1〉〉; this, in contextcc0, gives rise tocc |= ιi . Finally, we need
to conclude that incc0, we havecc |= ι f , whereιf = 〈〈abovec,A,B,S0, 1〉〉. This is what we
will do now.
In our proof, we will first transfer the factcc |= ιi to cAT, then reason thaton implies
above, and finally carry this new fact tocc. As noted earlier, this will be the path 1-2-3-4-5
in Figure 1. Here is the proof briefly. Using the first constraint (volves) in Eq. block 15
with the anchoringf1(σ̇ ) = S0, f1(ṡ) = s0, f1(ẋ) = A, and f1(ẏ) = B, we transfer
〈〈onc, A, B, S0, 1〉〉 from cc to 〈〈onAT, A, B, 1〉〉 in cAT. This corresponds to the tracing
of the arrows labeled 1 and 2 in Figure 1. We will use the same anchoring function when
we return tocc. In cAT, using the anchoringf2(ẋ) = A and f2(ẏ) = B, and equation
block 13, we get〈〈aboveAT,A,B, 1〉〉. This corresponds to the arrow labeled 3 in Figure 1.
After this implication ofabovefrom on, we should transfer the fact tocc. This is done
using the second constraint (involves) in equation block 16 with the anchoringf1. The result
is 〈〈abovec,A,B,S0, 1〉〉. This completes the proof path 1-2-3-4-5. Using two anchoring
functions (f1 grounded atcc0 and f2 grounded atcAT), we have carried out the proof of
McCarthy in our situation theoretic framework.
Let us emphasize the major idea in the above analysis. Basically, the logical reasoning of
McCarthy is translated to an information-based reasoning, where the essential idea is to use
the supports relation and constraints (with proper anchorings). It is noted that since a material
equivalence, as in Eqs. 3 and 4, can be written as a conjunction of two material implications,
there are two symmetric constraints in each of Eq. blocks 15 and 16.
6. CONCLUSION
In the AI literature, there are a number of attempts toward a logical formalization of
context. Our formal model of context differs from these in being stated in the framework
of situation theory (Devlin 1991). The comparison of previous works and the situation
theoretic approach is summarized in Table 1, where the first row categorizes the language
of formalization. Since our work is essentially an application of Barwise’s ideas (Barwise
1986), no attempt is made in Table 1 to add an extra column corresponding to our approach.
Compared to other approaches, our proposal has two notable properties:
1. Dynamic contexts.We might easily require the contents of a context change dynamically.
We can add (delete) assumptions and rules into (from) a context. Having a dynamic notion
of context is not a novel thing for the logicist, since he can always modify a theory.
However, when we fortify our context with constraints whose background conditions are
also dynamic, we get nonmonotonicity in the framework of situation theory.
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TABLE 1. Comparison of Previous Work and the Situation Theoretic Approach.
Mc Gu Sh Gi Bu At Ba
Logic versus situation theory Logic Logic Logic Logic Logic Logic S.T.
Modal logic No No Yes No Yes No No
Natural deduction Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No
Supports circularity No No No No No Yes Yes
Partiality Yes Yes No Yes Yes ?∗ Yes
Dynamic context Yes Yes No ? Yes ? Yes
Natural language support ? Yes No No ? ? Yes
Mc H⇒ (McCarthy 1993; McCarthy and Buvaˇc 1994) BuH⇒ (Buvač and Mason 1993; Buvaˇc, Buvač, and Mason 1995)
Gu H⇒ (Guha 1991; Guha and Lenat 1994) AtH⇒ (Attardi and Simi 1995)
Sh H⇒ (Shoham 1991) BaH⇒ (Barwise 1986)
Gi H⇒ (Giunchiglia 1993)
∗(? denotes lack of information regarding a particular issue, or an incomplete characterization.)
2. Natural language support.Situation theory adopts a more natural outlook regarding
natural language concepts (Barwise and Perry 1983). Thus, our approach might lead to
simpler interfaces in NLP applications.
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